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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to becoming a professor, I spent about eight years practicing 
corporate tax law.  I did both tax controversy and tax planning work.  
During those years, I handled a wide variety of tax issues, but there was 
a reoccurring non-tax issue that plagued my colleagues and me: When
does the attorney–client privilege protect tax communications? 
 
            ∗   Associate Professor at Phoenix School of Law.  The author would like to thank her research 
assistants Ms. Suwini Foe and Ms. Brittany Chavez. 
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The answer to this question is not as straightforward as one might 
initially assume.1  In other settings, it is often fairly easy to predict when 
privilege does or does not apply.  If a criminal law defendant tells her 
client where she hid a murder weapon, that conversation is clearly 
within the scope of the attorney–client privilege.  If an entrepreneur e-
mails her lawyer to ask if she can fire a pregnant employee without 
being sued, that note and the lawyer’s response are undoubtedly 
shielded by privilege. 
Things are not as clear-cut in a tax practice.2  Communications 
involving tax lawyers can sometimes be protected by privilege, but the 
long-standing general rule was always that communications involving 
tax accountants were not.3  Further, courts have repeatedly opined that if 
a tax lawyer is doing work that a tax accountant could have done, then 
the lawyer is viewed as doing tax accounting work beyond the scope of 
the attorney–client privilege.4  Unfortunately, the delineation between 
the tax attorney and tax accountant professions has long been murky, if 
not illusory.5  This situation has made it challenging to predict when 
privilege will (or will not) apply in the tax context.6 
In 1998, this challenge was exacerbated when Congress enacted 
section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or the Code) to create 
the Federally Authorized Tax Practitioner Privilege (FATP).7  FATP 
was a new privilege to shield certain communications with tax 
accountants (among other non-lawyer tax professionals).8  Confusingly, 
the statute adapted for such non-lawyers the already muddled tax 
attorney–client privilege framework.9  To make matters worse, the 
 
 1. Paul Seraganian, Schedule UTP and Evidentiary Privilege in the Tax Law, 21 J. INT’L TAX  
30, 39 (2010) (noting the “unsettled state of the law” applying privilege in the tax context and discussing 
the need for “clarity and predictability” in this area of law). 
 2. Id. (noting the “unsettled state of the law” applying privilege in the tax context and 
discussing the need for “clarity and predictability” in this area of law). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 4. See, e.g., id. 
 5. Seraganian, supra note 1, at 34–35 (“There is significant uncertainty under existing 
authorities regarding the respective perimeters of legal advice on one hand and accountant’s work on the 
other, and the degree to which these spheres of activity may overlap.  In particular, although some 
authorities suggest that the preparation of tax returns should be regarded as an accountant’s function, 
there appears to be little consensus regarding the point at which legal advice that is ultimately reflected 
in a tax return ceases to be eligible for the privilege.”). 
 6. Id. at 39 (noting the “unsettled state of the law” applying privilege in the tax context and 
discussing the need for “clarity and predictability” in this area of law); Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Does 
the Attorney–Client Privilege Apply to Tax Lawyers?: An Examination of the Return Preparation 
Exception to Define the Parameters of Privilege in the Tax Context, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 699, 700 
(2008). 
 7. 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 8. Id. § 7525(a)(1). 
 9. Id. 
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courts interpreting section 7525 have sometimes been inconsistent with 
the pre-existing attorney–client privilege framework.10  In some cases 
the section 7525 case law has even been internally inconsistent.11  This 
case law has led to even more confusion as to when privilege protects 
tax communications. 
Because of this chaos, I have observed there to be a huge variance of 
understandings within the Tax Bar as to when privilege applies.  At one 
extreme, some tax practitioners assume that all of their work-related 
communications are privileged.  At the other extreme, others assume 
that none of their communications are protected.  When I was in 
practice, my colleagues and I always wished that some learned scholar 
would write articles to bring clarity to this situation, but none did.  So, I 
left practice and entered the academy myself. 
From the start of the academic phase of my career, I envisioned a 
trilogy of articles to cover the key areas of confusion.  The first article 
would explain when attorney–client privilege does—and does not 
attach—in the tax setting.  The second would dissect the section 7525 
case law to explain where some of the courts had gone awry.  The third 
article would focus on the issue of subject matter waiver in a tax 
practice.  Many practitioners are unsure which actions trigger a waiver.  
Further, in my experience, many practitioners believe a waiver only 
impacts a particular document that may be disclosed, and many are 
blissfully unaware of the wide breadth of a subject matter waiver. 
In 2008 and 2010, respectively, I published the first two articles in 
this planned trilogy.12 This third and final article begins where those 
prior articles left off.  Assuming privilege has initially attached, this 
Article explores the law to identify when one loses privilege through 
waiver, and discusses the repercussions of such waiver. 
Identifying when privilege is waived in the tax setting is quite vexing.  
Tax practitioner communications are often shared (or at least implicated 
in communications) with many persons beyond the taxpayer-client.13  
Most taxpayers who may benefit from privilege have sophisticated 
business or estate transactions with complex tax consequences.14  As a 
 
 10. Claudine V. Pease-Wingenter, Lemons from Lemonade: The Courts Fumble the FATP 
Privilege, 129 TAX NOTES 977, 986 (Nov. 29, 2010) (citing Doe v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 
627, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2003)). 
 11. Id. at 985 (citing United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 n.4 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(“The KPMG opinion was internally inconsistent in finding the Exception applied to bar the FATP 
privilege to Document 22, but did not bar application of the attorney–client privilege to Document 
442.”). 
 12. Id. at 977; Pease-Wingenter, supra note 6, at 699. 
 13. See Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2002 WL 31934139, 
slip op. at *7 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2002). 
 14. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Types of Motivation That Render a Communication Incident or 
Germane to a Protected Relationship, in THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY 
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result, most such taxpayers do not prepare their own tax returns.15  The 
return preparers they hire need to know at least the conclusions of a tax 
practitioner’s advice (and sometimes even their supporting analysis) in 
order to do their jobs to prepare the taxpayer-client’s tax returns.16  
There is uncertainty as to what (if anything) can be shared with such 
return preparers without triggering waiver.17 
To effect the privileged advice of a tax practitioner, the taxpayer-
client’s tax returns (and sometimes supporting documentation) generally 
must be filed or otherwise disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS or the Service).18  There is controversy as to whether the act of 
filing one’s return waives privilege as to any underlying 
communications about advice from a tax practitioner.19  Largely due to 
some broad holdings in case law, some practitioners believe that it 
does.20  However, if filing a return triggers a subject matter waiver, then 
privilege would be completely gutted in the tax context as virtually all 
tax advice eventually appears on a filed tax return.21 
Beyond issues involving returns, there are also more subtle contexts 
where waiver is potentially implicated.  In the corporate context, 
independent auditors may need to access privileged tax advice 
communications to certify a corporation’s financials.22  Granting such 
access can waive privilege.23 
If the IRS assesses a penalty, a taxpayer-client may assert reliance on 
counsel as a defense.24  However, such a defense can have devastating 
consequences if it is deemed to have triggered a subject matter waiver.25 
Because of the lingering confusion in these situations, and because 
there are many traps for the unwary, this Article will attempt to bring 
clarity to this muddled state of affairs.  Part II reviews basic privilege 
concepts.  Part III discusses important cases applying waiver principles 
in common tax fact patterns like those described above.  Part IV reflects 
 
PRIVILEGES § 6.11.1 (2012) (“It is felt that ‘a taxpayer should not be able to invoke a privilege simply 
because he or she is wealthy enough to afford to hire an attorney to prepare a tax return.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2003 WL 1548770, 
slip op. at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2003). 
 17. See Long-Term Capital Holdings, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2002 WL 31934139, at *4. 
 18. Gregory C. Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney–Client Privilege, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 201, 229 (2010). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 21. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 18, at 229. 
 22. See United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 151–52 (D.R.I. 2007); United States 
v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539–40 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 23. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d at 152; El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 540. 
 24. In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 25. Id. 
4
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on certain lessons learned from the state of the law.  Finally, Part V 
states the author’s conclusion. 
II.  THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVILEGE LAW 
A waiver of privilege presupposes that privilege initially has attached 
to certain communications, but that protection is subsequently lost.26  
Thus, to understand the basics of waiver, one must first have a solid 
understanding of when privilege attaches.  Parts II(A) and II(B) provide 
primers on attorney–client privilege and the section 7525 FATP, 
respectively.  Part II(C) then summarizes the basic legal principles 
governing waiver. 
A. Attorney–Client Privilege 
Federal law, not state law, is the basis of privilege claims in a federal 
income tax practice.27  However, the source of the rule, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501, simply defers to common law.28  As a result, the federal 
attorney–client privilege is enunciated in different ways by different 
courts.29  A common statement of the elements is based on the work of 
Professor Wigmore: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that 
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal 
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.30 
In applying the elements of privilege, courts have emphasized that only 
communications are protected, but underlying facts are not.31  The 
Supreme Court has shed light on this subtle delineation: 
The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say 
or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact 
within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such 
 
 26. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 27. United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 808–09 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 28. FED. R. EVID . 501; Kent Sinclair, Rule 501 Privileges: General Rule, in PLI TRIAL 
HANDBOOK (2012) (“Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege.”) 
(citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)). 
 29. See Knogo Corp v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. 936, 938 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (using Judge 
Wyzanski’s formulation of the elements of privilege).  But see United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 
F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1997) (using Wigmore’s formulation). 
 30. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 684; see Joni Larson, Tax Evidence III: A Primer on the 
Federal Rules of Evidence as Applied by the Tax Court, 62 TAX LAW. 555, 622 (2009). 
 31. Larson, supra note 30, at 622. 
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fact into his communication to his attorney.32 
In applying privilege, courts have determined that the requirement of 
communications “made . . . in confidence” require the client to have a 
subjective intent that the communications be kept confidential.33  As a 
result, if a client provides an attorney with information so that the 
attorney can pass it along to third parties, privilege would not attach to 
those communications.34 
Although courts have repeatedly confirmed that the attorney–client 
privilege does have application in a tax practice, they have also 
developed the “Return Preparation Exception” (alternatively the 
“Exception”).35  Pursuant to the Exception, the scope of privilege does 
not extend to certain documents and other communications associated 
with the preparation of a tax return.36 
Documents pre-dating the request for return preparation services 
clearly fall within the Return Preparation Exception.37  Such documents 
typically include financial or accounting records.38  The Return 
Preparation Exception has also frequently been applied to workpapers 
created in the course of preparing the client’s return.39  These two 
applications of the Exception are not very controversial and seem 
consistent with other broader principles of attorney–client privilege. 
However, the Return Preparation Exception has also sometimes been 
applied to communications by a client of factual information to an 
attorney.40  When that factual information is then incorporated by an 
attorney into a tax return, the Exception sometimes bars the protection 
of privilege.41  Courts have adopted different legal rationales to justify 
application of the Exception in this context.42 
Some courts have theorized that privilege never attaches to the 
communication of such factual information because the elements of 
privilege require that the client must communicate with an attorney in 
 
 32. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).  
 33. United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 34. United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D. Tenn. 1965) (“Any communication by 
the client with the understanding that the information would be inserted in the return must be divulged.  
The reason is that, with such an understanding, it could not be intended to be confidential.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 35. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 6, at 707–08. 
 36. Id. at 707. 
 37. Id. (citing, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 707 (citing, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 40. Id. at 708. 
 41. Id. at 722 (citing, e.g., Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966)). 
 42. Id. at 708. 
6
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her capacity as a lawyer.43  Such courts have held that preparing a tax 
return is an accounting function, and not an occasion for the provision of 
legal advice.44  As a result, a client’s provision of factual information for 
return preparation services is not viewed as a communication with an 
attorney in her legal capacity.45 
Other courts have used a different legal rationale and emphasized the 
initial need for confidentiality for privilege ever to attach.46  Such courts 
have theorized that when clients communicate factual information for 
attorneys to incorporate into a tax return, there is never the requisite 
client intention of confidentiality.47  The view is that the client implicitly 
wants the attorney to divulge the communicated information because tax 
returns are prepared to be filed with a third party, i.e., the IRS.48 
Both of these rationales have weaknesses.  Courts are not unanimous 
in the view that return preparation services are an accounting function 
and not a type of legal service.  In Colton v. United States, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly held that “the preparation of tax 
returns . . . [is] basically [a] matter[] sufficiently within the professional 
competence of an attorney to make [it] prima facie subject to the 
attorney–client privilege.”49 
Additionally, courts have recognized that even in the return 
preparation context, not all communications between the client and 
attorney are intended to be incorporated into the return.50  To that end, 
they have held that the requisite lack of confidentiality is only found in 
communications of facts that actually are included in filed tax returns.51  
By contrast, communications of factual information that is not 
transmitted on the return have been deemed to have the necessary intent 
for confidentiality such that privilege attaches.52 
Because of the Return Preparation Exception, it is quite possible that 
privilege will not initially attach to communications when an attorney is 
preparing a tax return or directing a non-lawyer to do so.  However, 
there are other settings where the Exception has no application and 
attorney–client privilege more easily attaches. 
For example, tax practitioners often advise clients about returns that 
have already been filed.  Such advice typically arises in performing tax 
 
 43. Id. at 709 (citing, e.g., Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 713. 
 47. Id. at 714 (citing, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636–37 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
 48. Id. at 715 (citing, e.g., United States. v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 49. Colton, 306 F.2d at 637. 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Neb. 1970). 
 51. Id. at 179–80; Colton, 306 F.2d at 638. 
 52. United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324, 326. (D. Tenn. 1965). 
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controversy work, where the attorney is consulted to defend the filed 
return.  It is without doubt that attorney communications can be 
privileged when the attorney is representing a client in tax litigation.53 
It is less obvious what the outcome is when the tax controversy is still 
at the administrative level, but there are strong indications that 
communications in that setting may also be protected.54  Indeed, some 
cases have concluded that privilege does attach when the attorney 
represents the client in an IRS audit.55 
There appears to be no case law on privilege when the attorney 
represents a client before the IRS Office of Appeals (IRS Appeals), but 
there are strong arguments that privilege attaches in that setting too.56 
IRS Appeals is considered to be an adversarial setting.57  Indeed, for 
purposes of the work product doctrine, IRS Appeals satisfies the 
“litigation” element.58  It thus seems logical that privilege would attach 
as easily at IRS Appeals as in the case of actual litigation in court. 
By contrast, there is confusion as to whether and when privilege 
might attach prior to filing a return.  Such attorney advice generally 
involves the proper characterization and reporting of a particular event 
or events.  As a result, courts have delineated such attorney advice as 
either “pre-transaction” or “post-transaction” advice.59 
Pre-transaction advice involves educating a client on potential tax 
repercussions before she engages in a contemplated transaction.  
Depending on the substance of the pre-transaction advice, the client may 
even ultimately decide against engaging in certain transactions.  
Alternately, the attorney may suggest modifying a contemplated 
transaction to improve the tax impact.  Many cases have held that pre-
transaction communications are within the scope of privilege.60  Like 
communications in the tax controversy context, it seems clear that pre-
 
 53. Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Ira B. Shepard, Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine in Tax 
Cases, 58 TAX LAW 405, 407 (2005); Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., Attorney–Client Privilege: 
When Does Tax Advice Qualify as “Legal Advice”?, TAX NOTES TODAY, 2002 TNT 237–50 (Dec. 9, 
2002). 
 54. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 6, at 724. 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Hankins, 631 F.2d 360, 364–65 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963); 
United States v. Nelson, 65 F.R.D. 563, 565 (M.D.N.C. 1974).  But see Boca Investerings P’ship v. 
United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 56. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 6, at 724. 
 57. See Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., When is the Work of a Tax Professional Done in 
Anticipation of Litigation and Thus ‘Work Product’?, 98 J. TAX ’N 155, 157 (2003). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See United States v. Willis, 565 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D. Iowa 1983). 
 60. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984); 
United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, No. 02-C-4822, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5555, at *22, slip op. at 
*24 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2005); United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002); In re Federated Dep’t Stores, 170 B.R. 331, 355 (S.D. Ohio 1994). 
8
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transaction advice falls well within the scope of the attorney–client 
privilege. 
However, it has been suggested that post-transaction advice may not 
be privileged, but may trigger application of the Return Preparation 
Exception.61  Nonetheless, the weight of precedent is that the privilege 
does attach in the post-transaction context.62  However, it is possible that 
communication explicitly on return preparation matters may trigger the 
Exception.63 
B. Section 7525 
Accountants and lawyers have long had overlapping practices in the 
tax context.64  However, accountants were at a perennial disadvantage in 
such turf battles because they had no professional privilege to protect 
client communications.65  Because of lobbying by accounting firms, 
Congress added section 7525 to the Code in 1998.66 
Section 7525 states that with respect to “tax advice,” communications 
between a taxpayer and a “federally authorized tax practitioner” will 
receive the “same common law protections of confidentiality which 
apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney.”67  
Somewhat redundantly, the statute says that such common law 
protections apply “to the extent the communication would be considered 
a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an 
attorney.”68 
A “federally authorized tax practitioner” is defined to include 
certified public accountants, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries and 
enrolled retirement plan agents.69  Thus, the FATP does not cover all 
accountants. 
The statute defines “tax advice” in a cryptic manner: “advice given by 
an individual with respect to a matter which is within the scope of the 
individual’s authority to practice” before the IRS.70  This means that 
 
 61. See Willis, 565 F. Supp. at 1193. 
 62. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Liebman, 
742 F.2d 807, 810 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, No. 02 C 4822, 94 A.F.T.R.2d 
2004-5066 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2004); United States v. Lake, 257 F. Supp. 35, 37 (E.D.N.C. 1966). 
 63. Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966); Olender v. United States, 210 
F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 64. Jared T. Meier, Understanding the Statutory Tax Practitioner Privilege: What is Tax Shelter 
“Promotion”? , 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 677 (2011). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 7525(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 70. Id. § 7525(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
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only communications involving federal tax matters can be protected by 
section 7525.71  However, the statute simply sidesteps the tricky case 
law delineation between privileged “tax advice” and matters falling 
within the scope of the Return Preparation Exception.  Nonetheless, 
brighter line guidance is provided to prohibit application of FATP in the 
context of criminal tax matters and tax shelters.72 
Because of existing confusion about the parameters of the Return 
Preparation Exception, some courts have erroneously denied FATP 
protection to “tax advice.”73  Such opinions have been heavily criticized 
as subsuming the FATP by applying an overly broad understanding of 
the Return Preparation Exception.74  One such opinion was even 
internally inconsistent and contrary to the plain wording of section 
7525.75  It egregiously applied the Return Preparation Exception to deny 
FATP protection to “tax advice” from accountants while similar “tax 
advice” from a lawyer was not subject to the Return Preparation 
Exception and was protected by the attorney–client privilege.76 
By contrast, other courts have done a better job applying FATP.  
Illustratively, in the 2007 case, United States v. Textron, the taxpayer 
had asserted FATP to protect tax accrual workpapers.77  The District 
Court for the District of Rhode Island provided helpful guidance in 
understanding the statutory term “tax advice”: 
Since [the corporate taxpayer’s] tax accountants participated in advising 
Textron regarding its tax liability with respect to matters on which the 
law is uncertain and/or estimating the hazards of litigation percentages, 
they were performing “lawyers’ work.” Accordingly, that advice would 
qualify for the privilege conferred by § 7525(a).78 
Thus, per the District Court, FATP has application (and the Return 
Preparation Exception has no bearing) when a federally authorized tax 
practitioner advises a client about tax liability when the tax law is 
“uncertain.”  By extension, “estimating the hazards of litigation” 
suggests the need for analysis of matters where the tax law is 
“uncertain” such that it is not clear how a court would rule.  Thus, it 
seems more likely that the Return Preparation Exception might bar 
protection when the tax repercussions are undisputed and clear. 
 
 71. Attorney–Client Privilege Applies to Communications with Accountants and Other Federally 
Authorized Practitioners, 34 AM. JUR.2D, Federal Taxation ¶ 70053 (2012). 
 72. 26 U.S.C. § 7525(b) (2012). 
 73. Doe v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629–30 (W.D.N.C. 2003). 
 74. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 10, at 986. 
 75. See United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 76. Id. at 40. 
 77. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 148 (D.R.I. 2007). 
 78. Id. 
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In construing FATP, the Court of Federal Claims has also warned 
against overly broad applications of the Return Preparation Exception: 
Not “every communication from an attorney to his or her client is 
discoverable so long as it relates in any fashion to the preparation of a 
return.”79  The court explained: 
[C]ommunications offering tax advice or discussing tax planning have 
been held to be ‘legal’ communications protected by the attorney–client 
privilege . . . .  These rulings, which recognize that preparing a return is 
not all a matter of mechanics and mathematics, serve to effectuate one of 
the main purposes of the privilege, that is, to encourage clients to “make 
well-informed legal decisions and conform their activities to the law.”80 
Again, the Court of Federal Claims seems to limit the Return 
Preparation Exception to situations when advice to prepare a return is “a 
matter of mechanics and mathematics.”  In other words, the Exception 
seems to bar protection when the federally authorized tax practitioner is 
consulted to perform mechanical tasks (e.g., copying numbers from pre-
existing client documents) or performing mathematical computation 
(e.g., summing expenditures to determine the amount of deductions 
permissible).  By contrast, when the federally authorized tax practitioner 
is consulted to opine on the appropriate application of tax law to a 
particular client fact pattern, then FATP applies. 
These cases interpreting section 7525 can also be helpful in 
understanding the proper scope of the Return Preparation Exception in 
the context of the attorney–client privilege.  Because the FATP is 
generally supposed to be co-extensive with the attorney–client privilege, 
a well-developed explanation of the Return Preparation Exception in the 
section 7525 context also has application in construing the federal 
attorney–client privilege. 
C. Waiver 
Having described when the attorney–client privilege and the FATP 
initially attach, the next critical issue becomes determining when the 
protections of such privileges might thereafter be lost.  If privilege 
attaches to protect certain communications, that protection is not 
necessarily permanent.  Indeed, the final element of Professor 
Wigmore’s formulation of privilege is “except the protection be 
waived.”81  Moreover, once a waiver occurs, it is permanent, and the 
 
 79. Evergreen Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 122, 130 (2007). 
 80. Id. at 130–31. 
 81. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States., 88 Fed.Cl. 1, 7 (2009). 
11
Pease-Wingenter: Skating Too Close to the Edge: A Cautionary Tale for Tax Practiti
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
964 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
protections of privilege cannot ever be regained.82  The permanence of 
waiver makes it critical to understand how it occurs. 
“Actual waiver” of privilege involves the disclosure of confidential 
communications to third parties.83  This can occur various ways.  
Privileged communications can be disclosed orally84 or in writing.85  In 
the digital age, disclosure via social media is even a possibility.86  
Moreover, even if a privileged communication is not explicitly 
conveyed to a third party, actual waiver can still be deemed to occur.87  
Merely allowing the public access to a privileged communication is 
considered a type of disclosure.88 
For purposes of actual waiver, third parties can include various 
persons such as a testifying expert,89 an attorney not advising on the case 
at hand,90 and an employee of an unrelated company.91  Significantly, a 
representative of a governmental agency can also be a third party for 
purposes of actual waiver.92  Thus, a disclosure to the IRS can trigger an 
actual waiver. 
It should be noted that sometimes actual waiver occurs even if the 
recipient of the disclosure is not a true third party.  For example, 
corporations can be a “client” for purposes of attorney–client privilege, 
but dissemination of an attorney’s legal advice among employees is 
generally limited to those employees on a “need to know” basis.93  Thus, 
a corporate client can waive privilege by disseminating privileged 
communications to other employees without such need.94 
 
 82. David M. Greenwald, Protecting Confidential Legal Information: A Handbook for Analyzing 
Issues Under the Attorney–Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 862 PLI/Lit 307, 417 
(2011) (citing Reitz v. City of Mt. Juliet, 680 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894–95 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (“Once the 
privilege is waived, waiver is complete and final.”). 
 83. Id.; Long-Term Capital Holdings, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2002 WL 31934139, slip op. at *2–3 
(D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2003) (describing disclosure of confidential communications as triggering an “actual 
waiver”). 
 84. See United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1462 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 85. See Jonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 697 (E.D. Va. 1987); Bowles 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 224 F.R.D. 246, 254–55 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 86. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4286329, slip op. 
at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010) (plaintiff waived the privilege by disclosing her legal strategies and 
motivation for pursuing the action on her blog and through emails and Gmail Chat conversations). 
 87. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 596 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 227 F.R.D. 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 90. United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1462 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 91. Jonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 697 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
 92. See Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007) (disclosure to a 
social worker waives privilege). 
 93. Greenwald, supra note 82, at 423. 
 94. Byrnes v. Jetnet Corp., 111 F.R.D. 68, 72 (M.D.N.C. 1986). 
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The elements of privilege provide the underlying rationale for finding 
actual waiver in cases of disclosure.  For privilege to attach initially, one 
of Wigmore’s elements is that the communication must be “made in 
confidence.” Courts have explained that a subsequent disclosure is 
inconsistent with such confidentiality and triggers waiver.95 
In addition to actual waiver triggered by disclosures of privileged 
communications, certain uses of privileged materials can trigger an 
“implied waiver.”96  For example, this occurs when a client puts 
privileged communications at issue in a case.97  If a client asserts 
reliance on advice of counsel as a defense in litigation, the attorney’s 
advice becomes an issue in the case such that privilege is impliedly 
waived.98  Similarly, if a client sues her attorney for malpractice, the 
attorney’s advice is considered to be placed at issue and an implied 
waiver has occurred.99 
Sometimes a client affirmatively takes action with the intent of 
waiving privilege.  Other times the waiver is not intentional.  As one 
might imagine, the former is less common than the latter.100  Because 
privilege is such a powerful protection, clients rarely desire to relinquish 
it.  Few published cases involve a client’s affirmative decision to waive 
privilege.101  Such cases tend to involve the client receiving (or 
 
 95. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Moreover, it is the client’s responsibility 
to insure continued confidentiality of his communications.  In In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973), Judge Friendly, speaking for the Court, 
warned: [i]t is not asking too much to insist that if a client wishes to preserve the privilege under such 
circumstances, he must take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality.’  Id. at 82.”). 
 96. Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States., No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2002 WL 31934139, slip 
op. at *4 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2002) (“An ‘implied waiver [of the attorney–client privilege] may be found 
where the privilege holder asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected 
communications.’  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182–83 (2000).  For example, ‘a party 
who voluntarily asserts an advice-of-counsel defense is deemed to have waived its privilege with respect 
to the advice received.’”). 
 97. New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 408 Fed. Appx. 908, 919 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 98. Thomas M. Geisler, Jr., Proof of Waiver of Attorney–Client Privilege, 32 AM. JUR. 3D Proof 
of Facts 189 (2012) (“A party claiming an implied or at issue waiver of attorney–client privilege must 
make some showing that the opposing party relies on the privileged communication as a claim or 
defense or as an element of a claim or defense.”). 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc); see also 
Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Posner, Posner & Assocs., P.C, 499 F. Supp. 2d 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 100. PAUL R. RICE, 2 ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 9:21 (2012) 
(describing the reality that waiver occurs based on client conduct, which may not reflect client intent, 
the author observes that “[i]f an intention to waive were required, waiver would seldom result from 
clients’ disclosures”). 
 101. See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, No. 01-CV-3, 2001 WL 1682858, slip op. at *6 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 1, 2001) (To prove up his ineffective assistance of counsel defense on appeal, the petitioner 
affirmatively waived in writing his attorney–client privilege with respect to trial counsel); e also 
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 151 (1949) (The Court pragmatically noted the low likelihood that 
the petitioner would waive a valuable evidentiary privilege without being offered something equally 
valuable in exchange, i.e., protection against prosecution). 
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attempting to receive) some type of benefit from the decision to 
waive.102  However, particularly in the tax setting, where the privilege 
rules have long been so confused, an unintended waiver due to 
misunderstanding of the confused rules is a real possibility and a 
frequent concern of practitioners and clients. 
It should be noted that not all unintended disclosures necessarily 
result in the loss of privilege protection.  For example, a party may 
inadvertently provide an adversary with privileged documents in 
response to large discovery requests.103  When there has been such an 
inadvertent disclosure of a privileged communication, taking reasonable 
steps can cure the would-be waiver under certain circumstances.104  
However, a failure to make a timely objection to the disclosure will 
result in a waiver.105 
In the tax context, however, taxpayers do not necessarily make such 
inadvertent disclosures very often.  Indeed, in the United States Tax 
Court, the discovery process is considered less burdensome than in most 
civil litigation.106  Instead, it is more common that taxpayers and their 
advocates do not realize they have triggered a waiver because the tax 
privilege rules have been so confused.  As a result, it becomes critical to 
determine the extent of a waiver after it has occurred.107 
Traditionally, the disclosure or use of privileged communications has 
not merely resulted in a waiver of those specific communications; 
rather, there are much wider repercussions.108  The waiver is deemed to 
extend to all communications regarding the same subject matter.109  
Such “subject matter waiver” can force the client to provide previously 
non-disclosed documents on the same subject matter and testimony can 
be compelled on the same subject matter.110 
The alternative to subject matter waiver would be “selective waiver” 
of only whatever has been disclosed or used inappropriately.111  
 
 102. Smith, 337 U.S. at 151. 
 103. Greenwald, supra note 82, at 437. 
 104. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79). 
 105. Id. (citing Large v. Our Lady Of Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 94 Civ. 5986, 1998 WL 65995, slip 
op. at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1998); FDIC v. Ernst & Whinney, 137 F.R.D. 14, 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) and 
Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 440 (D.D.C. 1983)). 
 106. Cym H. Lowell & Jack P. Governale, Involvement of IRS Attorneys, U.S. INT’ L TAX : PRAC. 
&  PROC. ¶ 5.03 (2012) (describing the “carefully circumscribed rules of the Tax Court with respect to 
discovery”). 
 107. Seraganian, supra note 1, at 35. 
 108. Greenwald, supra note 82, at 427. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Roberta M. Harding, “Show and Tell”: An Analysis of the Scope of the Attorney–Client 
Waiver Standards, 15 REV. LITIG. 367, 388 (1995); Developments in the Law—Privileged 
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1633 (1985). 
 111. RICE, supra note 100, § 9:81. 
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However, courts have prevented clients from using this approach.112  
Their rationale is based on concerns of fairness.113  If a client could 
choose to waive some—but not all—communications on a particular 
subject matter, she could use helpful privileged communications as a 
“sword” but hide damaging communications behind the “shield” of 
privilege.114 
Because subject matter waiver is the general rule, the definition of the 
waived subject matter is critical in determining which other 
communications are no longer protected.  Defining the waived subject 
matter is dependent on the “nature and context of the disclosure, the 
resulting advantages to the client and disadvantages to the adversary, 
and of course the objectives of the attorney–client privilege.”115  In 
weighing these factors, fairness is an overriding consideration in 
determining the extent of the subject matter waiver.116  This approach 
fails to provide bright line precision, and leaves the courts with much 
discretion.117 
Nonetheless, as a general matter, the courts tend to take a fairly 
narrow approach in defining the waived subject matter118  Matters not 
explicitly addressed in the disclosed communications are typically not 
considered to be a part of the waived subject matter.119  However, due to 
the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, it is difficult to predict 
outcomes.120 
One last point about waiver is worth re-emphasizing.  A waiver 
presupposes that privilege initially attached to protect the 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; see also, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 224 F.R.D. 411, 413 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); United 
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 115. RICE, supra note 100, § 9:83. 
 116. Seraganian, supra note 1, at 35 (“The scope of waiver appears to be determined case by case 
and largely by reference to considerations of fairness.  An assessment of fairness in this context requires 
a delicate balancing of competing interests.  On one hand, consideration is given to the notion that the 
integrity of the adversarial process would be impaired if a client were entitled to selectively disclose 
certain advantageous elements of a confidential communication when doing so would advance the 
client’s case against its adversary, while at the same time asserting privilege in respect of related 
communications that would be damaging to the client.  On the other hand, consideration of fairness also 
appears to take into account that, where a client is not seeking to selectively disclose certain elements of 
privileged communications in a self-serving manner, waiver of excessively wide scope may constitute 
an unjustifiable advantage for the client’s adversary.”). 
 117. Id. at 39 (“They also strongly suggest that determinations regarding the scope of waiver in 
any particular case touch raw policy nerves and are not susceptible to resolution by broad rules of 
general application.  Rather, it seems that decisions about the appropriate breadth of a waiver of 
privilege require careful balancing and adjudication case by case.”). 
 118. RICE, supra note 100, § 9:83; Harding, supra note 110, at 388. 
 119. RICE, supra note 100, § 9:83. 
 120. Id. 
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communications at issue.121  Indeed, in Wigmore’s formulation, initial 
confidentiality and subsequent waiver are separate elements.122  If a 
communication with a tax practitioner was not initially made in 
confidence, then privilege never attached in the first place, such that a 
subject matter waiver is just not possible.123  This point is sometimes 
lost when courts write with imprecision in their published opinions; they 
blur the line between initial lack of confidentiality and subsequent loss 
of confidentiality.124  But this point can have huge repercussions to 
clients who may or may not be forced to divulge previously undisclosed 
confidential communications due to application of subject matter waiver 
principles. 
Moreover, this is particularly a critical legal nuance to explore in the 
tax setting where there can be much confusion as to whether privilege 
ever attaches initially.125  Because of that confusion, there is a risk that 
parties may jump prematurely to assertions and analysis of subject 
matter waiver.  However, it must be remembered that not until it has 
been determined that the basic elements of privilege are satisfied is it 
ever appropriate to move to an analysis of whether there has been a 
waiver, and a determination of the possible scope of a subject matter 
waiver. 
III.  IMPORTANT WAIVER CASES IN THE TAX CONTEXT 
Part III will summarize five particularly influential cases that 
illustrate the application of waiver principles in the tax setting.  A 2002 
case from the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut, Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, discussed 
the impact of disclosures to return preparers.126  The Eighth Circuit’s 
1972 opinion, United States v. Cote, has been an important precedent for 
 
 121. See, e.g., Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1963). 
 122. In re Dow Corning Corp., 261 F.3d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 123. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d at 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) (“If 
confidentiality were not intended, of course, the privilege would not attach . . . .  Confidentiality may 
also, of course, be waived; but we see no indication that a waiver has yet occurred.”). 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d at 500–01 (“It is true that if the client 
transmitted the information so that it might be used on the tax return, such a transmission destroys any 
expectation of confidentiality.  That is, the transmittal operates as a waiver of the privilege.”) (internal 
citations omitted); Bernado v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 677, 686 (1995) (“Materials provided by a 
taxpayer to his attorney for tax preparation purposes are intended to be disclosed to the IRS in the 
taxpayer’s return.  Consequently, under such circumstances, the taxpayer is considered to have waived 
the attorney–client privilege as to such information.”). 
 125. Seraganian, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
 126. See Long-Term Capital Holdings v. U.S., No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2002 WL 31934139, slip op. at 
*4–5 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2002), on reconsideration in part, Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United 
States, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2003 WL 1548770 (D. Conn. 2002). 
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the privilege repercussions of filing a tax return.127  Two different cases 
have been important to understanding the effect of sharing tax reserve 
materials with independent auditors: the Fifth Circuit’s 1982 opinion in 
United States v. El Paso Company and the United States District Court 
for the District of Rhode Island 2007 opinion in United States v. 
Textron, Inc.128  Finally, the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey’s 2003 opinion In re G-I Holdings Inc, is a critical illustration of 
the impact of reliance on counsel defenses.129  Each of these cases will 
be discussed in turn. 
A. Disclosures to Return Preparers (and the IRS): Long-Term Capital 
Holdings v. United States (2002) 
Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States was a 2002 United 
States District Court for the District of Connecticut opinion.130 With 
regard to related transactions, a taxpayer had secured one legal opinion 
from Shearman and Sterling (S&S) and a separate legal opinion from 
King and Spalding (K&S).131  To facilitate preparation of its tax return, 
the taxpayer had told the return preparer the conclusion of the K&S 
opinion.132  The taxpayer was later audited.133  During the “IRS’s 
administrative proceedings,” the taxpayer produced the S&S legal 
opinion.134  The case involved the IRS’s attempt to compel production 
of the K&S opinion over the taxpayer’s assertion of attorney–client 
privilege.135 
The IRS had two main theories to support its position that the 
taxpayer had waived privilege with regard to the K&S opinion.  First, 
the IRS alleged that waiver occurred with respect to the K&S opinion 
because the taxpayer had “disclos[ed] the substance of that opinion to its 
tax accountant.”136  The K&S opinion itself concluded that it was “more 
likely than not” that the taxpayer could take a particular tax deduction 
 
 127. See United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 128. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 151 (D.R.I. 2007); United States v. El 
Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 129. In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. at 432, 433 (D. N.J. 2003).   
 130. Long-Term Capital Holdings, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2002 WL 31934139, slip op. at *2–3 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 14, 2003) (describing disclosure of confidential communications as triggering an “actual 
waiver”). 
 131. Id. at *1. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at *1–2. 
 136. Id. at *2. 
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on its tax return.137  The taxpayer did not give the legal opinion itself to 
its tax accountant, but to enable the tax accountant to prepare the 
taxpayer’s return, the taxpayer did “disclose the gist or substance of the 
opinion” to him.138 
Interestingly, the court explicitly noted the motivation of the taxpayer 
in securing the legal opinion was “in part, to identify whether it could 
take the deduction.”139  This language seems to suggest the K&S 
opinion was sought to help determine the taxpayer’s return position.  As 
a result, it seems predictable that the taxpayer would have need to share 
the “gist or substance of the opinion” with the taxpayer’s return 
preparer.  Thus, one should logically question whether there was ever 
actual intent for confidentiality such that privilege would attach initially. 
Nonetheless, the court never explored this critical preliminary issue 
and simply jumped prematurely to a discussion of waiver.  The court 
stated that the taxpayer’s “disclosure of the ‘more likely than not’ 
language to its accountant is a disclosure of the gist of the opinion, and 
therefore weighs in favor of a finding that the attorney–client privileged 
was waived.”140 
The court elaborated that the taxpayer’s statement to its accountant 
was “more than just a general reference to the fact that [the taxpayer] 
had sought legal advice from K&S.”141  Instead, the taxpayer’s 
disclosure “referred directly to the advice received.”142  The accountant 
who prepared the taxpayer’s return testified that the taxpayer’s lawyer 
told him that they had a K&S opinion “upon which they would rely” 
because it opined that it was “‘more likely than not’ that the loss [could] 
be taken.”143  The court stated the “specificity of this disclosure [to the 
return preparer] weighs in favor of a finding of waiver.”144 
A second theory that the IRS asserted was that a waiver of privilege 
to the S&S opinion triggered a subject matter waiver extending to the 
K&S opinion.145  The taxpayer initially disputed this by claiming the 
S&S opinion was never protected by privilege.146  However, the S&S 
opinion itself indicated that it was a legal opinion in response to the 
taxpayer’s request for advice.147  Additionally, the taxpayer had 
 
 137. Id. at *3. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at *7. 
 142. Id. at *7. 
 143. Id. at *3 n.10. 
 144. Id. at *7. 
 145. Id. at *2. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at *5. 
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originally withheld the S&S opinion from the IRS by asserting attorney–
client privilege.148  From this record, the court quickly concluded the 
S&S opinion was privileged.149 
However, this is rather a remarkable conclusion with questionable 
legitimacy.  In other cases, privilege labeling has been given little or no 
credence.150  Further, a taxpayer’s own assertion of privilege is hardly 
dispositive of whether privilege actually attaches.151  Before jumping 
ahead to waiver, the court should have analyzed in greater depth 
whether privilege had ever attached to the S&S opinion. 
The taxpayer asserted alternatively that if the S&S opinion was 
privileged, it was not of the same subject matter as the K&S opinion.152  
The taxpayer’s alternative theory was that a waiver of the S&S opinion 
had no impact on the privilege protection of the K&S opinion because 
they involved different subject matter.153  In effect, this alternative was 
premised not on a denial that a waiver of S&S had occurred, but was 
dependent on a narrow definition of the waived subject matter. 
The court also found this alternative unpersuasive.  The taxpayer had 
asserted that the S&S opinion concerned the impact of lease transactions 
on the tax basis of certain stock contributed to a partnership, and the 
K&S opinion provided advice on “certain partnership tax issues.”154  
The court found the taxpayer’s distinction “insubstantial” because the 
issues were intertwined and addressed “the same overarching issue.”155  
The court concluded that the taxpayer’s production of the S&S opinion, 
which related to the issue discussed in the K&S opinion, “weighs in 
favor of a finding that the attorney–client privilege was waived” with 
respect to the K&S opinion.156  The court emphasized that the taxpayers 
made a “deliberate decision” to disclose the S&S opinion “in a forum 
where disclosure was voluntary and was calculated to their benefit.”157 
Ultimately, the court held the taxpayers waived attorney–client 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed.Cl. 313, 321–22 (Fed. Cl. 2008). 
 151. United States v. Willis, 565 F. Supp. 1186, 1204 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (“The burden of 
establishing the privilege is on the party asserting it; this burden extends to all the essential elements of 
the privilege, including the elements of confidentiality and nonwaiver of privilege . . . .  A party’s bare 
assertion that it intended the documents to be confidential does not satisfy the burden . . . .  Similarly, a 
party’s bare assertion that it did not intend to waive the privilege is an insufficient showing to meet its 
burden.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 152. See Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2002 WL 31934139, 
slip op. at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2002). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at *5. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *6. 
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privilege, but did not compel production of the K&S opinion because 
there were still separate lingering work product doctrine claims to 
analyze.158  Due to an amended record, the court also issued a later 
opinion in the same case, which modified slightly its analysis under 
somewhat extraordinary circumstances.159 
B. Filing a Tax Return: United States v. Cote (1972) 
In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, issued 
United States v. Cote.160  The case involved the IRS’s attempt to enforce 
a summons issued to Donald Cote and Thomas Murphy, a certified 
public accountant and lawyer, respectively.161  The taxpayers, John and 
Evelyn Erickson had employed Cote as a return preparer for years.162  
When the Ericksons were audited, Cote referred them to an attorney 
named Murphy, who in turn retained Cote to “audit” the taxpayers’ 
books and records.163  Because of information revealed in Cote’s audit, 
Murphy ultimately advised the Ericksons to file amended returns for 
several years.164 
After these returns were filed, a special agent of the IRS summoned 
Cote to “appear as a witness and produce all workpapers used in 
preparing both the original and amended returns.”165  Cote refused, 
claiming the workpapers were “in the possession and control” of 
Murphy.166  A similar summons was then issued to Murphy.167  In 
response, Murphy produced a copy of one original return and asserted 
privilege as to the underlying workpapers.168 
The summons dispute was litigated in the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota.169  The trial court ruled that the 
workpapers supporting the original returns had to be produced.170  That 
ruling was not disputed on appeal.171  The only issue before the Eighth 
 
 158. Id. at *9. 
 159. Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2003 WL 1548770, slip 
op. at *10 (D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2003). 
 160. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 161. Id. at 143–44. 
 162. Id. at 143. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 144. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 142. 
 170. Id. at 144. 
 171. Id. 
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Circuit was whether the attorney–client privilege extended to the Cote’s 
work memoranda used in preparing the amended returns.172 
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis began by observing that the trial court 
held “privilege did not attach” to the amended return workpapers 
because Cote was not under the direct control of Murphy, and Cote’s 
workpapers were not prepared to assist counsel in giving legal advice.173  
Analyzing the facts of Cote’s work with Murphy, the Eight Circuit 
concluded that “the accountant’s aid to the lawyer preceded the [legal] 
advice and was an integral part of it.”174  The court announced that the 
proper standard was “whether the accountant’s services are a necessary 
aid to the rendering of effective legal services to the client.”175  
However, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion was not explicit as to what the 
legal relevance of this relationship was. 
Though it was not clear the precise legal issue that the new standard 
analyzed, the next paragraph announced: 
Notwithstanding our recognition that the attorney–client privilege 
attached to the information contained in the accountant’s workpapers 
under the circumstances existing here, we find that by filing the amended 
returns the taxpayers communicated, at least in part, the substance of that 
information to the government, and they must now disclose the detail 
underlying the reported data.  A client may waive the privilege which 
protects what he earlier confided to his attorney or his attorney to him.176 
Thus, in a somewhat cryptic fashion, the court apparently provided 
analysis determining that privilege attached initially to Cote’s amended 
return workpapers, but also concluded the filing of the amended returns 
waived the privilege.  To support its waiver holding, the court provided 
just three sentences of analysis: 
Here, Cote, the accountant, testified that the information on his 
workpapers was later transcribed onto the amended returns which were 
filed by the taxpayers with the government.  This disclosure effectively 
waived the privilege not only to the transmitted data but also as to the 
details underlying that information.  As stated in U ited States v. Tellier, 
[t]he privilege attaches to the substance of a communication and not to 
the particular words used to express the communication’s content.177 
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion was very brief, but it has been very 
influential on other courts.178  Because it has been cited so widely, it is 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 144–45. 
 177. Id. at 145 (internal citations omitted). 
 178. United States v. Cote has been cited in over 600 publicly available court opinions, court 
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important to examine in greater depth what exactly was decided in this 
concise opinion. 
First, it should be noted the waiver was triggered in Cote because an 
accountant transferred “data” from his worksheets to the amended 
return, which was then filed.179  Typically, privilege would never even 
apply to such documentation.180  An accountant’s workpapers are 
generally not within the scope of the attorney–client privilege.181  
Indeed, even after enactment of section 7525, such return preparation 
workpapers are not even within the scope of FATP.182   
Cote involved a highly unusual fact pattern where an attorney hired 
an accountant to gather factual information to help determine whether 
amended returns were necessary.183  It was a fluke that privilege ever 
initially attached in the Cote facts such that waiver was properly at issue 
in the case.  As a result, absent similarly unique facts bringing return 
preparation materials into the scope of the attorney–client privilege, it 
would be inappropriate to cite Cote as broad precedent for waiver. 
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit explicitly warned against such possible 
over-reading of Cote.184  In Footnote 3, the court noted that “[i]n tax 
cases waiver is often not even an issue since the privilege is said not to 
attach to information which the taxpayer intends his attorney to report in 
the contents of a tax return.”185  To support this warning, the Eighth 
Circuit cited a long list of other influential opinions involving tax 
returns and analogous filings in nontax settings.186 
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit provided another strong warning in 
Footnote 4 of its opinion.187  The court instructed that future disputes as 
 
documents, administrative materials and secondary sources.  Search of Westlaw, KeyCite (May 17, 
2012). 
 179. Cote, 456 F.2d at 145. 
 180. United States v. Baucus, Civil No. 2984, 1971 WL 495, at *13 (D. Mont. 1971) (“While it is 
true that communications not intended to be confidential are not within the privilege, petitioners’ 
argument is too broad.  The work papers contain only raw data which Baucus used to prepare the returns 
and in this respect they are analogous to a client interview . . . as long as adequate mean . . . exist to 
compel Baucus to disclose the non-confidential matter, he should not be required to produce direct 
communications from his client because of the danger that confidential matter will also be revealed.”); 
Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (1966) (privilege does not attach when the return preparer 
acts merely as a “scrivener”). 
 181. Francis M. Dougherty, Privileged Communications Between Accountant and Client, 33 
A.L.R. 4TH 539 § 8 (citing United States v. Kelly, 311 F.Supp 1216 (E.D. Pa. 1969)). 
 182. United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 273 F. Supp. 2d 955, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(documents communicated or generated for the purpose of preparing a tax return are not within the 
scope of section 7525). 
 183. Cote, 456 F.2d at 143. 
 184. Id. at 143 n.4. 
 185. Id. at 143 n.3. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 143 n.4. 
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to whether particular workpapers contained “unpublished expressions 
which are not part of the data revealed on the tax returns” were to be 
submitted to the court for in camera rulings.188  The court explained this 
instruction: 
Too broad an application of the rule of waiver requiring unlimited 
disclosure by reason of filing an income tax return might tend to destroy 
the salutary purposes of the privilege which invite confidentiality 
between the attorney and client.  Such a rule is unnecessary to the 
recognition of the above principles.  See Colton v. United States, which 
specifically withholds disclosure of memoranda and worksheets to the 
extent they contain confidential data not already published on the tax 
return.189 
Finally, it should also be noted the unusual nature of the waived 
subject matter.  The taxpayers consulted the attorney, Murphy, only 
after they learned the IRS was auditing them.190  Murphy then hired the 
accountant, Cote, to “conduct an audit of taxpayers’ books and records,” 
the results of which led Murphy to advise the taxpayers to file the 
amended returns.191  The IRS sought first from Cote and then from 
Murphy “all workpapers used in preparing both the original and 
amended returns.”192  Thus, it appears the lawyer, whose involvement 
prompted the privilege claim, actually had a very limited role. 
Murphy had never been involved in any tax planning.  It appears he 
was representing the taxpayers before the IRS in the audit, but the scope 
of the taxpayers’ consultation is not clear in the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion.  It does not appear that he did much for the taxpayers other than 
direct Cote to audit their books and record; his sole advice to the 
taxpayers seems to be to file amended returns.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the IRS had not summoned Murphy to testify or produce privileged 
communications.  Instead, the IRS merely sought from the attorney the 
return preparation workpapers that the accountant had prepared and then 
given to Murphy.193  There was no claim of a subject-matter waiver 
giving the IRS access to Murphy’s written correspondence with the 
taxpayers or Cote.  The IRS was not seeking to depose Murphy to ask 
him to reveal confidential communications with his clients.  At issue 
were simply return preparation workpapers that would not have been 
privileged in most other situations.194   
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. (internal citations omitted.) 
 190. Id. at 143. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 144. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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Nonetheless, other courts have failed to heed the Eighth Circuit’s 
warnings and have read Cote to more broadly permit a subject matter 
waiver of all attorney communications relating to any matters 
incorporated in a filed tax return.195 
C. Disclosure to Independent Auditors 
Two important waiver cases involve independent auditors.  The first 
was poorly reasoned, but was decided by an appellate court and has 
been influential for decades.196  The second was issued just a few years 
ago by a district court, but it provides much clearer analysis for future 
cases.197 
1. United States v. El Paso Company (1982) 
In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, issued its 
opinion in United States v. El Paso Company.198  The case involved an 
IRS summons seeking a corporate taxpayer’s “tax-pool analysis.”199  
The taxpayer refused to comply with the summons based on several 
legal theories including attorney–client privilege.200  The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered a judgment 
enforcing the summons.201  The taxpayer then appealed to the Fifth 
Circuit, which affirmed.202 
The summoned analysis (a.k.a. “the noncurrent tax account, the tax 
 
 195. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Willis, 565 F. 
Supp. 1186, 1192, 1203–04 (S.D. Iowa 1983).  Despite indicating that privilege did not attach to 
information the client conveyed to the attorney that the attorney ultimately included in the filed return, 
the district court also noted it did not “intend to alter or eliminate the established principle that 
disclosure of information via submission of a tax return effects a waiver as to the details underlying the 
information reported.”  Id. at 1193.  The court later stated: 
Where the privilege is claimed regarding tax documents, the party asserting the privilege 
has a difficult burden to meet.  A good deal of information transmitted to an attorney by 
a client for tax return preparation is not intended to be confidential; rather, it is given to 
the attorney to be transmitted to others—“for example, for inclusion in the tax return.  
Such information is, of course, not privileged.” 
Id. at 1204.  In addition, filing tax returns with the IRS constitutes a waiver of the privilege “not 
only to the transmitted data but also as to the details underlying that information”); United States v. 
Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 196. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 197. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.I. 2007). 
 198. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530. 
 199. Id. at 532. 
 200. Id. at 533. 
 201. Id. at 532. 
 202. Id. 
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accrual work papers, and the tax pool analysis”) was a “summary” of the 
taxpayer’s “contingent liability for additional taxes should it ultimately 
be determined that [the taxpayer] owed more taxes than indicated on its 
return.”203  The purpose of the tax pool analysis was “solely to insure 
that the corporation sets aside on its balance sheet a sufficient amount to 
cover contingent tax liability.”204  The analysis was not used in 
preparing a return and was not a “source document of an actual 
transaction.”205  It was created to support the taxpayer’s financial 
accounting, not to report its tax liability.206 
The Fifth Circuit’s discussion of privilege included several initial 
paragraphs to lay out the relevant legal principles.207  The court then 
devoted just one paragraph to address whether the tax-pool analysis was 
within the scope of the attorney–client privilege.208  The court 
articulated both reasons why the tax pool analysis might be privileged 
legal work, as well as reasons why it might instead be non-privileged 
accounting work.209  The court’s analysis of the applicability of privilege 
then concluded with the strange statement: “We need not decide this 
issue, however, because we believe that El Paso’s attempt to claim the 
privilege fails on other grounds.”210  The next four paragraphs of the 
opinion are an analysis of waiver.211 
In its analysis of waiver, the court explained that to “retain the 
attorney–client privilege,” confidentiality “must be preserved” and a 
“breach of confidentiality” waives the privilege.212  The court then noted 
that the taxpayer discussed with its independent auditors “some of the 
information and many of the potential tax liability issues” in the tax pool 
analysis.213  The court elaborated: “Confidentiality as to these 
documents is neither expected nor preserved, for they are created with 
the knowledge that independent accountants may need access to them to 
complete the audit.”214  The court concluded that the taxpayer’s 
“disclosure of the tax pool analysis to the auditors destroys 
confidentiality with respect to it.  With the destruction of confidentiality 
 
 203. Id. at 532–33. 
 204. Id. at 535. 
 205. Id. at 535, 537. 
 206. Id. at 535. 
 207. Id. at 539. 
 208. Id. at 541. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 539. 
 211. Id. at 539–40. 
 212. Id. at 539. 
 213. Id. at 539–40. 
 214. Id. at 540. 
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goes as well the right to claim the attorney–client privilege.”215  Because 
it could not view the taxpayer’s “discussion with its auditors as 
confidential,” the court then held that the “attorney–client privilege is, 
therefore, waived.”216  The court then moved on to a separate issue for 
analysis.217 
El Paso was an incredibly sloppy opinion, which has unfortunately 
been quite influential on other courts.218  Before fully analyzing or 
providing a conclusion on whether privilege ever attached to the tax 
pool analysis, the court jumped ahead to an examination of whether 
privilege was waived.219  The court referenced a “breach” and a 
“destruction” of privilege,220 but there should have first been in-depth 
discussion of whether there was ever a privilege to breach or destroy.  
Indeed, the court emphasized that the tax pool analysis was created with 
an understanding that they would be shared with independent 
auditors.221  Because it sheds doubt on whether there was initial 
confidentiality, this point alone should have been cause to consider 
whether privilege ever attached. 
Moreover, the court’s waiver analysis was internally inconsistent.  In 
the same sentence, the court described the taxpayer as having “neither 
expected nor preserved” confidentiality with regard to the tax pool 
analysis.222  Those verbs carry very different connotations.  If one 
creates a document without an expectation of confidentiality, then it is 
not a communication “made in confidence” as Wigmore’s formulation 
requires for privilege to attach.  By the plain meaning of the word, one 
cannot preserve what never existed.  If there was an initial lack of 
confidentiality there is no “protection [to] be waived.” 
In his dissent, Judge Garwood tried valiantly to flag the majority’s 
flawed analysis and holding.223  He agreed that “El Paso failed to 
particularize its assertion of the [attorney–client] privilege and prove its 
case with respect to any specific document,” and on that ground he 
believed El Paso’s assertion of privilege should fail.224  Judge Garwood 
noted his concern with the majority’s waiver analysis: 
 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 541. 
 217. Id. at 541–42. 
 218. Search of Westlaw, KeyCite (May 17, 2012).  United States v. El Paso Co. has been cited 
nearly 2,000 times in publicly available cases, administrative materials, secondary sources and court 
documents. 
 219. See El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 539. 
 220. Id. at 539–40. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 540. 
 223. Id. at 545–51. 
 224. Id. at 549. 
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I am concerned, however, with the majority’s holding that El Paso 
waived any possible attorney–client privilege.  Not only is this holding 
unnecessary to the result reached, but this case presents a particularly 
unfortunate context within which to make such a determination of waiver.  
Because we really have no information whatever respecting any asserted 
attorney–client communication, determining whether the privilege in 
regard thereto has been waived is virtually impossible (which is another 
good reason to deny blanket assertions of the privilege).225 
Because the taxpayer’s assertion of privilege was so anemic, Judge 
Garwood believed it was not even possible on the record to determine 
whether privilege initially attached.  The jump to the waiver issue was 
simply without solid foundation. 
Moreover, Judge Garwood also criticized the overly broad scope of 
the majority’s waiver finding: 
But what of the supporting memoranda and items in the tax pool analysis 
that are not discussed with or shown to the auditors?  (The evidence and 
findings below indicate such items exist, and indeed that a substantial 
number of the “subject files” fell into this category.)  Moreover, even 
regarding a subject file or tax pool item that has been “discussed” with 
the auditors, the scope of the waiver would appear to depend on the scope 
of the discussion.  Surely not every discussion relating to a topic included 
in a file mandates a waiver of the entirety of every item in that file.  
Footnote 18 in United States v. Davis far too slender a reed to bear the 
full weight of such an extensive holding.226 
To emphasize the overly broad analytical approach the majority took, 
Judge Garwood offered the following common sense analogy: 
For example, a young man informs his mother that he was at the 
convenience store which was held up earlier in the evening.  At her 
suggestion he sees Lawyer Jones, and on returning home his mother asks, 
“Did you tell Lawyer Jones you were at the store when it was held up?”  
He acknowledges that he did so.  Has he thereby waived the privilege as 
to his entire conversation with Lawyer Jones respecting the occurrence at 
the store?227 
With this simple analogy, Judge Garwood demonstrated the need for 
some principled parameters in declaring a waiver.  A mere generalized 
mention of a topic to a third party cannot trigger a subject matter waiver 
of all details thereof without gutting the privilege.  Such gutting would 
not be wise from a policy perspective. 
With an ironic word choice, Judge Garwood concluded, “For these 
reasons I cannot accept the majority’s blanket and unnecessary 
 
 225. Id. at 550. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at n.16. 
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invocation of waiver of the attorney–client privilege in the context of 
this case.”228 
Unfortunately, the majority did not heed Judge Garwood’s warning. 
2. United States v. Textron, Inc. (2007) 
Twenty-five years after the Fifth Circuit decided El Paso, there was 
another landmark opinion involving application of privilege to a tax 
pool analysis.229  United States v. Textron, Inc. was a 2007 opinion by 
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.230  The 
IRS had sought to enforce a summons on the corporate taxpayer’s “tax 
accrual workpapers,” but the taxpayer refused to produce them.231  The 
taxpayer asserted multiple theories, including application of attorney–
client privilege, the FATP, and work product doctrine.232  The court 
determined that the attorney–client privilege and FATP were “waived,” 
but due to application of the work product doctrine, the court ultimately 
denied the government’s petition to enforce the summons.233 
The government appealed, but the First Circuit initially affirmed.234  
After granting a rehearing en banc, the First Circuit vacated the District 
Court’s judgment and held that the tax accrual workpapers were not 
within the scope of the work product doctrine because there were not 
prepared in anticipation of litigation.235  Nonetheless, because the 
District Court’s holding on attorney–client privilege was not appealed, it 
was not disturbed by the First Circuit’s subsequent opinion.236  
Significantly, the District Court’s precedent on attorney–client privilege 
is still good law.237 
The District Court’s conclusion with regard to privilege was similar 
to that of the Fifth Circuit’s in El Paso, but Textron’s analysis is much 
clearer and more thorough.  It provides stronger, better-articulated 
precedent on the same issue. 
The District Court provided five solid paragraphs analyzing whether 
 
 228. Id. at 551 (emphasis added). 
 229. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.R.I. 2007). 
 230. Id. at 141. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 142–46. 
 233. Id. at 152–55. 
 234. United States v. Textron, Inc., 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 235. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 236. Claudine V. Pease-Wingenter, The Application of the Attorney–Client Privilege to Tax 
Accrual Workpapers: The Real Legacy of United States v. Textron, 8 HOUS. BUS. &  TAX L. J. 337, 348–
349 (2008). 
 237. Id. at 349. 
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privilege initially attached, before affirmatively concluding that it did.238  
The court carefully delineated between privileged attorney work and 
non-privileged accountant work in various contexts, including return 
preparation and audit representation.239  The court explained existing 
precedent to note that “legal advice provided by an attorney may be 
privileged even though [it is] made in connection with the preparation of 
a return” because “[d]etermining the tax consequences of a particular 
transaction is rooted entirely in the law.”240  Similarly, privilege may 
attach when an attorney participates in an IRS audit “to deal with issues 
of statutory interpretation or case law” raised in an examination of the 
taxpayer’s return.241 
Applying such synthesis to tax accrual workpapers, the court 
concluded the attorney–client privilege applied because the documents 
“essentially consist of nothing more than counsel’s opinions regarding 
items that might be challenged because they involve areas in which the 
law is uncertain and counsel’s assessment regarding Textron’s chances 
of prevailing in any ensuing litigation.”242 
The District Court also provided a thoughtful analysis of the 
taxpayer’s assertion of FATP.  The court stated that because the 
taxpayer’s CPAs “participated in advising Textron regarding its tax 
liability with respect to matters on which the law is uncertain and/or 
estimating the hazards of litigation percentages, they were performing 
‘lawyers work’” such that FATP applied.243  The court then analyzed 
and rejected the government’s assertion that the section 7525(b) 
exclusion for tax shelters barred application of FATP.244 
After thorough analyses as to whether attorney–client privilege and 
FATP attached, in a later portion of the opinion, the court then provided 
analysis of waiver.245  Parenthetically, this internal segregation in the 
opinion seems to be a conceptually prudent approach to ensure readers 
do not erroneously conflate these separate issues.  The court’s analysis 
of the waiver issue was relatively short and straightforward.246  The 
undisputed fact was that the taxpayer had provided the tax accrual 
workpapers to its independent auditors.247  The court held that this 
action waived both the attorney–client privilege and FATP in doing 
 
 238. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d at 146–47. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 146 (internal citations omitted). 
 241. Id. at 146–47. 
 242. Id. at 147. 
 243. Id. at 148. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 151–52. 
 246. See id. 
 247. Id. at 151. 
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so.248 
This conclusion was not surprising.  Textron had tried to argue that 
“because it occasionally revises its reserves based on the opinions of the 
independent auditor,” the auditor’s review should be considered to be 
“in connection with providing ‘tax advice’ to Textron.”249  The court 
rejected this attempt by noting that independent auditors actually have a 
professional responsibility to report to the investing public whether a 
company’s financial statements fairly and accurately reflect its financial 
condition.250  Such responsibility defies assertion of a confidential 
relationship.251  Indeed this conclusion is consistent will a large body of 
prior case law holding that independent auditors have a non-privileged 
relationship with the companies they audit and a disclosure of privileged 
communications to them waives privilege.252 
D. Reliance on Counsel for Penalty Protection: In re G-I Holdings Inc. 
(2003) 
In 2003, the District Court for the District of New Jersey issued its 
opinion for the case In re G-I Holdings Inc.253  The corporate taxpayers 
at issue were debtors in bankruptcy when the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue asserted claims for unpaid income tax liabilities and 
penalties.254  The claims were based on certain transactions with a 
limited partnership.255  The government theorized that one transaction 
was actually a taxable disguised sale of property.256  Alternatively, the 
government urged that the taxpayers recognized taxable gain because 
either there was no partnership for tax purposes or the taxpayers were 
not a partner thereof.257  Because the government’s claims would require 
“substantial and material consideration of non-bankruptcy Code 
statutes,” the District Court for the District of New Jersey ultimately 
 
 248. Id. at 152. 
 249. Id. at 151–152. 
 250. Id. at 152. 
 251. Id.  
 252. See, e.g., First Fed. Savs. Bank v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 263, 269–70 (Fed. Cl. 2003); In 
re Honeywell Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 293, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States ex rel. 
Robinson v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21439871, slip op. at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2003); 
Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Cantor 
Fitzgerald Sec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 414, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 
(1973). 
 253. In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 254. Id. at 430. 
 255. Id.  
 256. Id.  
 257. Id. (internal citations omitted.) 
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exercised jurisdiction over the claim.258 
The corporate taxpayers moved to bifurcate the litigation into two 
phases; the first would focus on the “substantive tax” issues and (if 
necessary) the second would address penalties.259  To meet their burden 
in establishing the need for such bifurcation to “avoid prejudice,” the 
taxpayers explained they wanted to avoid the “prejudice” of premature 
waiver of the attorney–client privilege.260  In defending against the 
penalty claims, the taxpayers indicated “they might assert a ‘reasonable 
cause’ affirmative defense” by showing “the taxpayer reasonably relied 
on professional advice” as permitted under I.R.C. section 6664(c)(1) and 
Treasury Regulation section 1.6664-4(b).261  The taxpayers argued that a 
bifurcation would allow them to “delay disclosure of confidential 
communications with their legal counsel until the penalty phase.”262  
They argued this would allow them to “limit their waiver of the 
attorney–client privilege to the penalty phase only and protect their 
privileged communications in a substantive tax phase.”263 
Interestingly, in considering the Motion to Bifurcate, the District 
Court identified the dispositive issue as whether the requested 
bifurcation would even accomplish the goal of limiting their waiver of 
privilege.264  The court noted that when a party cites legal representation 
as an affirmative defense, the advice is placed “at issue” such that the 
attorney–client privilege is waived.265  The court explained the rationale 
for the rule was to permit the opposing party to the litigation to be able 
to “test what information was conveyed by the client, whether counsel 
was provided with all material facts in rendering advice, and whether 
that advice was heeded by the client.”266 
The court also noted the rule against selective waiver:  
The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, 
waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of 
confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to 
communications whose confidentiality has already been compromised for 
his own benefit.  The attorney–client privilege is not designed for such 
tactical employment.267 
 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. at 431. 
 260. Id. at 430–31. 
 261. Id. at 431. 
 262. Id.  
 263. Id.  
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. at 431. 
 266. Id. at 432. 
 267. Id.  
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The court observed that once attorney–client communications are placed 
at issue, the party waives privilege “with regard to all communications 
on the same subject matter.”268  Further, once a party waives privilege, 
“it relinquishes the privilege for all purposes and circumstances 
thereafter.”269 
Though the taxpayers argued that they were “currently in a position to 
decide whether to waive their attorney–client privilege,” the court held 
they already had waived privilege.270  The court noted that in its 
interrogatories, the government had asked the taxpayers whether they 
contended they were not liable for the asserted penalties.271  If the 
taxpayers contended there were not so liable, the interrogatories also 
asked them to “state the basis for that contention . . . including 
communications with tax and/or legal advisors.”272  The taxpayers’ 
response to the interrogatories indicated they had “consulted with 
outside legal counsel and other advisers regarding the tax treatment” of 
the transaction in question.273  The court concluded this amounted to a 
permanent waiver of privilege because it put the legal advice at issue.274 
The court then shifted gears to define the subject matter, to which the 
waiver extended.275  The court applied a very broad definition: “the tax 
treatment of the 1990 Transaction and Subsequent Events.”276  As “tax 
treatment” is an extremely expansive concept, it seems unlikely that the 
scope of the waiver did not encompass any previously privileged 
communications.  Indeed, arguably, the court might have taken a 
narrower approach by identifying certain tax law issues as the waived 
subject matter.  The court decided against that sort of a definition. 
Because the court determined privilege had already been a subject 
matter waiver “allowing the Government to access relevant 
communications for tax and penalty phases of litigation,” it denied the 
Motion to Bifurcate and addressed other issues in the case.277  One such 
issue was the government’s request to depose famed tax attorneys, 
William S. McKee and William F. Nelson, who had provided tax 
planning to the taxpayers on the transaction at issue in the case.278  
Because of the broad subject matter waiver, the court instructed that the 
 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. at 432. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id.  
 274. Id. at 433–34. 
 275. Id. at 433. 
 276. Id.  
 277. Id. at 434. 
 278. Id. at 437. 
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taxpayer “must produce relevant communications between them and 
McKee and Nelson,” and the “Government may depose McKee and 
Nelson.”279   
The court was utterly unsympathetic to the taxpayer’s claims that Mr. 
Nelson’s continued role as attorney on the case and his potential 
material witness created a conflict of interest.280  The court sided with 
the government in finding the taxpayers had “created the very prejudice 
of which they complain.”281  The court affirmed the government’s right 
to depose Mr. Nelson, and kindly reminded him to comply with the 
relevant Rules of Professional Conduct when he gave his testimony.282 
IV.  LESSONS LEARNED 
Both practitioners and courts have much to learn from these important 
waiver cases.  The key lessons will be discussed below. 
A. Practitioners Beware 
In my twelve years of professional experience, it has been my 
observation that tax practitioners are extremely well-versed in matters 
involving tax codes, but typically are not as familiar with issues 
grounded in non-tax legal authorities.  Moreover, even the best Evidence 
courses in law school typically only spend a class or two studying 
privileges of all kinds.283  As a result, it is no wonder that even many 
veteran tax practitioners are not terribly familiar with the leading cases 
involving the application of attorney–client privilege in the tax context.  
For such practitioners, two main points are particularly important to take 
from the waiver cases summarized in Part III. 
1. It’s Easy to Waive: Be Careful with References to Tax Advice 
When I was in practice, I sometimes encountered in colleagues and 
clients an overconfidence about the availability and permanence of 
privilege, and a lack of awareness that subject matter (not selective) 
waiver was the prevailing rule.  As a sort of shock therapy, I would tell 
them about In re G-I Holdings Inc.  It was eye-opening to learn that 
 
 279. Id. at 437–38. 
 280. Id. at 437. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 438. 
 283. E-mail from Joshua Kanassatega, Assistant Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law (Jun. 
4, 2012) (on file with author); e-mail from Placido Gomez, Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law 
(May 18, 2012) (on file with the author). 
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renowned tax advisers like William S. McKee and William F. Nelson 
had accidentally waived privilege and were forced to testify against their 
clients to divulge intimate details of their elaborate tax planning 
schemes. 
But that misstep by such titans in the tax field can be a useful lesson 
for the rest of us mere mortals.  The court in In re G-I Holdings Inc. held 
that privilege was waived because of the taxpayers’ response to an 
interrogatory asking whether they contended they were not liable for the 
asserted penalties.284  That interrogatory also specifically asked that if 
the taxpayers contended they were not so liable to “state the basis for 
that contention . . . including communications with tax and/or legal 
advisors.”285  In retrospect, it is clear that answering such questions were 
a trap for the unwary. 
The opinion indicates the taxpayers’ response to these questions 
(which were no doubt prepared by their learned counsel) revealed that 
the taxpayers had “consulted with outside legal counsel and other 
advisers regarding the tax treatment” of the transaction in question.286  
This response was a fatal error. 
It should be a huge red flag to practitioners whenever the government 
asks questions about communications with tax and/or legal advisors.  In 
In re G-I Holdings Inc., the pivotal questions came during litigation in 
the form of interrogatories.287  But in other cases, such questions might 
arise much earlier.  For example, they could easily be posed during the 
initial audit phase of a tax controversy. 
Whenever such questions arise, the appropriate response would be an 
assertion of privilege and a refusal to answer further.  The court’s 
holding in In re G-I Holdings Inc. may seem surprising to some tax 
practitioners, but it is actually quite consistent with the body of case law 
in similar non-tax contexts.288 
One helpful illustration is Nguyen v. Excel Corporation, a case 
involving the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).289  The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed a finding that the corporate client waived privilege when it 
failed to object to “all questions designed to elicit information about 
privileged communications” during testimony by its executives.290  The 
Fifth Circuit noted that the corporate client had “raised some privileged-
 
 284. In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. at 432–33.  
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 433. 
 287. Id. at 432–33. 
 288. See, e.g., United States v. Sander, 979 F.2d 87, 91–92 (7th Cir. 1992); Hollins v. Powell, 773 
F.2d 191, 196–97 (8th Cir. 1985); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT et al., 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2016.1, at 228–29 (3d ed. 2012). 
 289. Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 290. Id. at 206–07. 
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based objections” to some questions posed.291  But the failure to object 
to all such questions was the critical flaw.292 
Notably, the corporate client in Nguyen v. Excel Corporation had 
believed it had not waived privilege because it had deliberately not 
raised a “reliance-on-advice-of-counsel as support for its good faith 
defense” to the FLSA claims.293  As a result, it claimed it had not placed 
at issue the attorney’s advice.294  The corporate client further 
characterized the executives’ responses as having involved only 
“‘generic’ references to communications with counsel.”295  The 
corporate client believed it had successfully navigated the minefield of 
privilege waiver.  However, in the court’s judgment, the allegedly 
“generic” references had crossed a vague line and were too specific to 
preserve privilege.296 
Because specificity is in the eye of the beholder and waiver is 
permanent, it is best to err on the side of caution and assert privilege 
instead of responding to any questions that potentially might be 
interpreted as inquiring about confidential communications. 
2. Tactical Decisions to Waive: Understand the Potentially Wide Scope 
In Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, the taxpayer’s major 
misstep was its decision to provide the S&S legal opinion to the 
government during the IRS’s administrative proceedings.297  The court 
initially held this document was privileged and this disclosure was a 
waiver.298  This holding was detrimental to the taxpayer because the 
court then defined the waived subject matter to encompass the K&S 
legal opinion.299  Thus, the taxpayer’s assertion of privilege as to that 
withheld opinion failed.300 
To many tax practitioners who have represented clients in 
“administrative proceedings,” the taxpayer’s decision to provide the 
S&S opinion may not be surprising.  Providing some significant 
documentation on a disputed point can sometimes satisfy those issuing 
Information Document Requests (IDRs) from asking for the kitchen 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 207. 
 293. Id. at 205. 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. at 209. 
 297. Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2003 WL 1548770, slip 
op. at *1 (D. Conn. 2003). 
 298. Id. at *5. 
 299. Id. at *5. 
 300. Id. at *4. 
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sink.  Particularly in the corporate context, IDRs can be so broad and 
encompassing that they require ample resources to respond adequately 
and in a timely fashion.  Consequently, there is often an ongoing 
negotiation with the IRS about the breadth of what a taxpayer will 
actually provide in response to a particular IDR.301  However, in the 
context of such negotiations, it is important to remember waiver 
repercussions when deciding what to provide. 
Whenever a taxpayer contemplates the production of documentation 
in response to an IDR (or other administrative request), the taxpayer 
must first scrutinize whether attorney–client privilege or FATP might 
possibly attach to the contemplated documentation.  In Lo g-Term 
Capital Holdings v. United States, it was not obvious that the S&S 
opinion was privileged.302  Nonetheless, in its first opinion, the court 
never analyzed this issue in any great depth before jumping ahead to the 
waiver issue.303  As a result, practitioners should err on the side of 
caution when making a determination that documentation might or 
might not be privileged.  If there is any possibility that privilege might 
have attached, the documentation should be withheld. 
In the real world practitioners face difficult dilemmas, and sometimes 
tactical decisions are made to waive privilege.  If that is contemplated, it 
is critical to analyze carefully how a court might define the scope of a 
waived subject matter.  Although commentators have asserted that the 
subject matter is generally defined in a narrow fashion,304 the cases 
described in Part III demonstrate that is not always true in the tax 
context.  Before making a tactical decision to waive privilege by 
providing some protected documentation, practitioners should determine 
the widest possible scope of the waived subject matter and discern if it is 
 
 301. Erin M. Collins & Edward M. Robbins, Jr., Other Factors to Consider for an LB&I 
Examination, PLI REF-IRS § 7:4.2, at 7–27 (2012) (“Orally discussing IDRs prior to issuance provides 
the opportunity to negotiate before the IRS has formalized its requests.  Generally, it is more difficult to 
negotiate the wording once the IDR has been issued.”). 
 302. Long-Term Capital Holdings, 2003 WL 1548770 at *1–2. 
 303. Id. at *4–5. It should be noted that in the court’s subsequent unpublished opinion in the case, 
the court entertained the taxpayer’s motion for reconsideration and did reverse course somewhat.  Id.  
After an in camera review, the court ultimately held that the K&S opinion was separate from the S&S 
opinion “as the former does state the consideration of possible tax consequences that may have resulted 
from a subsequent transaction.”  Id. at *2.  Thus, the scope of waiver was much curtailed in the court’s 
second opinion.  Id. at *2–3.  Moreover, after some creative legal maneuvering by the taxpayers, they 
were also able to convince the court that the S&S opinion was never privileged in the first place.  Id.  
However, this holding is unlikely to apply to many other taxpayers as it was premised on an assertion 
the legal opinion was necessary to comply with sections 722 and 723 of the Internal Revenue Code and 
Treasury Regulations section 301.6231(a)(3)-(1)(c)(2).  Id. at *4.  The court’s granting of such a motion 
for reconsideration and the taxpayer’s ability to supplement the record so abundantly is extraordinary.  
Id. at *4–5. Other taxpayers should not rely in the future on the ability to follow suit and get a second 
bite at the apple.  Id. 
 304. See RICE, supra note 100, § 9:83, at 2 (2011); Harding, supra note 110, at 388. 
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truly desirable to waive all communications within that scope.  Again, 
because of the permanence of waiver, it is prudent to be conservative in 
such analysis and decision-making. 
3. The Independent Auditor Minefield 
The taxpayers in El Paso and Textron faced a common dilemma 
amongst public corporations.  On the one hand, they could more easily 
secure a favorable opinion from their independent auditors by giving 
them free access to their tax accrual workpapers and supporting 
documentation.  The pitfall with this option is that the taxpayer will 
surely be deemed to have triggered a subject matter waiver on all 
sensitive tax matters discussed therein.  That is not a pleasant possibility 
for the taxpayer or its advisers. 
The other option is to give little or no access to their tax accrual 
workpapers in order to preserve privilege.  However, the result is likely 
a qualified or unfavorable opinion from the independent auditors.  
Because of the catastrophic repercussions to the corporation from such 
an opinion, that option is not a practical consideration. 
Corporation taxpayers must therefore walk a tightrope between the 
extremes of full access and no access in an attempt to satisfy the 
independent auditors while trying to preserve privilege.305  There are 
unfortunately no silver bullets to this dilemma. 
However, it has been recommended that waiver might be avoided by 
preparing especially for the independent auditors separate summary 
documentation about the reserve.306  Courts have always emphasized 
that privilege never protects facts; it only attaches to certain confidential 
communications.307  To the extent that only factual summaries of the 
reserve components are provided to independent auditors, privilege 
 
 305. Ricardo Colón, Caution: Disclosures of Attorney Work Product to Independent Auditors 
May Waive the Privilege, 52 LOY. L. REV. 115, 116 (2006) (“Corporations face difficult choices as 
auditors and lawyers strive to carry out their separate and sometimes conflicting responsibilities in the 
post-Sarbanes world.  Corporations whose independent auditors request disclosure of information 
ordinarily protected by the attorney–client privilege or by the attorney work product privilege must 
decide whether to disclose the information and risk waiving applicable privileges and protections, or to 
withhold such information and risk receiving a qualified audit opinion or even a disclaimer of 
opinion.”). 
 306. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 236, at 353–54. 
 307. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981) (“[T]he protection of the privilege 
extends only to communications and not to facts.  A fact is one thing and a communication concerning 
that fact is an entirely different thing.  The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did 
you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge 
merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.”  
(quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962))). 
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should be viewed as intact.308  The pragmatic question remaining would 
be whether such factual summaries satisfy the independent auditors. 
B. Advice for the Judiciary 
Because some waiver cases in the tax context have been sloppily 
written or poorly reasoned, or both, the courts also have important 
lessons to learn from the cases summarized in Part III to avoid making 
the same mistakes as their predecessors. 
1. Understand the Limited Scope of Cote’s Waiver by Tax Return Filing 
As explained in Part III(B), Cote involved extremely unusual facts 
that the Eighth Circuit relied upon to find that an accountant’s return 
preparation workpapers were initially privileged.  Only because of the 
unusual facts to support an attachment of privilege was the Eighth 
Circuit correct in moving to an analysis of waiver due to the taxpayer’s 
filing of a tax return. 
However, future courts should not be quick to follow Cote’s waiver 
analysis.  The deeply entrenched general rule is that return preparation 
workpapers are not privileged.309  Without a finding of privilege initially 
attaching, it is legally incorrect to jump ahead to a discussion of waiver.  
Again, one cannot be deemed to waive protection that never existed in 
the first place.310 
The Eighth Circuit was mindful of the exceptionality of the facts 
before it.  Cote contains an explicit warning that most tax cases should 
never even reach an analysis of waiver.311  The court stated, “In tax 
cases waiver is often not even an issue since the privilege is said not to 
attach to information which the taxpayer intends his attorney to report in 
the contents of a tax return.”312  This is an important reminder of the 
criticality of not jumping prematurely to a waiver analysis. 
Moreover, even if future courts find that privilege attaches to 
communications involving return matters, it is helpful to recall what was 
at stake in Cote.  The taxpayers had consulted with the attorney only 
upon notification of an IRS audit, and it appears his role was 
 
 308. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 236, at 353–54. 
 309. J. Bradford Anwyll, Administrative Audits: Audit Techniques and Procedures, ST009 ALI-
ABA 1 (2011) (“Thus, there is no privilege created for . . . tax return preparation . . . .”); James H. 
Feldman & Carolyn Sievers Reed, Silences in the Storm: Testimonial Privileges in Matrimonial 
Disputes, 21 FAM . L. Q. 189, 234 n.187 (1987). 
 310. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 6, at 713. 
 311. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 312. Id. at 145 n.3. 
38
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/4
2013] THE HAZARDS OF WAIVER FOR TAX PRACTITIONERS 991 
circumscribed.313  The IRS never claimed a waiver extended to all of 
Murphy’s written or oral communication with the taxpayers or their 
accountant.  The IRS issued a narrow summons to the lawyer to get only 
the accountant’s return preparation workpapers, which the accountant 
had conveyed to Murphy.314 
In enforcing the summons, the Eighth Circuit implicitly defined the 
scope of the waived subject matter in a very narrow fashion to include 
only the worksheets supporting the amended return.  Indeed, the court 
explicitly rejected “too broad” a definition of the waived subject matter 
“requiring unlimited disclosure by reason of filing an income tax 
return.”315  The court warned that adopting such an overly broad 
definition “might tend to destroy the salutary purposes of privilege 
which invite confidentiality between attorney and client.”316 
The court’s warning was apt.  Virtually all tax planning advice is 
reflected in some sense in how the taxpayer files its return.317  To 
implement such tax planning advice, the tax return must be effected in 
some way.318  If courts apply “too broad” a definition of subject matter 
waived by virtue of filing the return, then the privilege will be 
eviscerated in the tax context.  Privilege will never protect any 
confidential tax communications if waiver by return filing extends 
beyond a very narrowly defined subject matter (i.e., return preparation 
workpapers). 
Indeed, if “too broad” a definition is the rule, then there would be 
greater need to analyze whether privilege ever attached.  If filing a 
return (a necessity to implement tax planning advice) were always a 
trigger for a broad subject matter waiver, then it seems doubtful that any 
communications involving tax advice could be viewed as “confidential.”  
Such an understanding, however, would defy extensive case law.319  
Further, it would make enactment of section 7525 a meaningless 
gesture.  It is a well-entrenched rule of statutory construction that courts 
should not supposed that Congress has enacted unnecessary statutes.320 
The Eighth Circuit’s warning against “too broad” a definition of 
 
 313. Id. at 143.  
 314. Id. at 143–44. 
 315. Id. at 145 n.4. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 18, at 229. 
 318. Id.  
 319. See Jay L. Carlson & David A. Roman, The Tax Advice Privilege Is Alive and Well, Tax 
Notes Today, LEXIS 2003 TNT 77-28 (Apr. 21, 2003). 
 320. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Halverson v. 
Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 
Inc., 102 F.3d 712 715 (4th Cir. 1996); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1977). 
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waived subject matter is also consistent with other precedent.  For 
example, the District Court for the Southern District of New York in 
1983 addressed the government’s assertion that a corporate taxpayer had 
waived privilege by filing an amended tax return.321  In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum instructed: 
[The taxpayer did not] disclose the disputed documents themselves; 
rather, [the taxpayer] simply made public [i.e., in the filed return] certain 
conclusions which it based on the work incorporated in the disputed 
documents.  No authority has been cited for the proposition that a 
document loses its privileged nature simply because the owner of the 
privilege relies on the material contained in the document in making a 
statement in another document.”322 
The court was making an important distinction.  A filed tax return does 
not disclose confidential communications.  Instead, a return simply 
contains conclusions based on the confidential communications.  
Conveying such conclusions alone does not waive privilege.  The court 
elaborated, “By the mere filing of a tax return, the taxpayer does not 
agree to disclose to all comers the documentation underlying the 
deductions claimed.”323 
This rule is logical because it demonstrates an understanding that a 
broader understanding of subject matter waiver due to return filing 
would eliminate all privilege protection for tax planning. 
The next year, the Third Circuit in United States v. Liebman issued a 
similar holding.324  The IRS had contended that the taxpayers had 
waived privilege because they deducted certain fees to a law firm for tax 
advice.325  The court rejected this theory: “Since the mere deduction of 
the fee did not disclose the substance of the communication, it could not 
constitute a waiver of the privileged substance of the advice 
received.”326 
Indeed, tax returns contain only very summary numerical 
information.  They do not divulge what parties have communicated 
confidentially about the computation of that summary numerical 
information. 
The District Court for the Northern District of California issued a 
similar opinion in 1996.327  The government had asserted that the 
taxpayer waived privilege as to certain tax credits at issue by claiming 
 
 321. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 566 F. Supp. 883, 883–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 322. Id. at 884. 
 323. Id. 
 324. United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 325. Id. at 808. 
 326. Id. at 810 n.4. 
 327. United States v. Chevron Corp., 77 A.F.T.R. 2d 1548 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
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those credits on its filed return.328  The court rejected this theory and 
held there was no implied waiver associated with the claimed tax 
credits.329 
Moreover, beyond the tax setting, other cases have produced 
analogous holdings to support a narrow scope of waived subject matter 
from filing a tax return.  For example, in Natta v. Hogan, private 
litigants disputed the applicability of privilege to certain documents in a 
patent dispute.330  Montecatini argued that the requirement of “full 
disclosure” in patent proceedings undercut any privilege protection 
Phillips might have otherwise enjoyed.331  The Tenth Circuit rejected 
this assertion: 
In our opinion this does not foreclose the assertion of a claim of privilege 
in a patent proceeding.  The attorney–client privilege is designed ‘to 
facilitate the administration of justice,’ in order ‘to promote freedom of 
consultation of legal advisors by clients.’  We see no reason why this 
long-established principle should not be applied to patent cases.  The 
public interest is in the development of the truth, both in patent 
proceedings and in ordinary litigation.  The duty of full disclosure differs 
from the freedom of consultation with lawyers.332 
The court went on to explain: 
We agree with Phillips that an automatic waiver of the privilege does not 
occur when a patent controversy is presented . . . .  The record contains 
no waiver of the privilege by Phillips.  It undoubtedly gave information to 
its attorneys so that they could act on it in the preparation of papers used 
in the patent proceedings.  The situation is like that where a client gives 
general information to his lawyer so that the lawyer may prepare a 
complaint in any ordinary civil action.  The fact that some of the 
information is thus publicly disclosed does not waive the privilege.333 
This analysis from the patent context and its analogy to civil complaints 
are helpful to understanding the extent of waiver caused by the filing of 
tax returns.  In all three settings, a client shares information that will 
undoubtedly be made public (i.e., in patent filings, a civil complaint or a 
tax return, respectively).  However, in each example, the motivation in 
seeking the attorney’s advice is the need to understand what information 
should be made public and how that information should be conveyed to 
comply with the law.  If the subsequent publication of some of the 
conveyed information triggered a broad subject matter waiver of all 
 
 328. Id. at *2. 
 329. Id. at *4–5. 
 330. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968). 
 331. Id. at 691. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 692. 
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confidential communications in the matter, then there would be a huge 
disincentive to ever consult an attorney.  That would defeat the purpose 
of the attorney–client privilege, which is to encourage more (not less) 
consultation with lawyers to ensure our country’s laws are properly 
obeyed and implemented. 
In 1980, the United States Court of Claims issued its opinion in 
another patent case, Knogo Corporation v. United States.334  The 
defendant filed a motion for the production of documents, which the 
plaintiff resisted by asserting the attorney–client privilege.335  The 
defendant raised issues of confidentiality to defeat the assertion of 
privilege.336 
The court noted this type of issue was not uncommon in patent cases:  
“Some of the most difficult discovery questions presented in patent 
litigation relate to the assertion of attorney–client privilege with respect 
to communications containing primarily or exclusively technical 
information . . . .” 
 [The documents at issue provide technical explanations, not explicit 
discussions of legal issues.]  However, it is clear that they were each 
prepared to provide the attorney with the information necessary to assess 
the invention’s patentability, prepare and file a patent application which 
led to the patent in suit, and prosecute that patent application through the 
Patent Office.337 
This description will sound familiar to tax practitioners.  Tax lawyers 
(and federally authorized tax practitioners) are often consulted by 
taxpayer-clients who provide financial data or information about 
transactions with a request for assistance in properly reporting their tax 
liability.  Sometimes, clients also request assistance in defending their 
tax reporting when the IRS challenges those reports.  Like the patent 
lawyer who must sift through technical information to “assess the 
invention’s patentability” and “prepare and file a patent application,” a 
tax lawyer is frequently called on by clients to sift through financial data 
and other factual information to assess the tax repercussions and advise 
on the preparation of a return to be filed with the IRS.338 
The Court of Claims instructed: 
The privilege only applies to the communication that takes place between 
the attorney and the client.  It does not apply to the technical information 
itself, so long as that technical information is sought by other discovery 
 
 334. Knogo Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. 936, 938 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
 335. Id. at 938. 
 336. Id. at 938–39. 
 337. Id. at 939. 
 338. Id. at 939. 
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techniques outside of the context of the attorney–client communication.  
In other words, the client cannot assert the privilege if asked how the 
invention works, but he can assert the privilege if he is asked to recount 
what he told his attorney concerning how the invention works.  The 
expectation of confidentiality applies to the communication, but not to the 
information contained in the communication.339 
Similarly, in the tax setting, financial data or other factual information is 
never privileged.340  Privilege extends only to confidential 
communications about the financial data or other factual information.341  
As a result, including such non-privileged information has no bearing on 
the continuing privilege protection that extends to confidential 
communications associated with it. 
Explaining the application of waiver principles in the patent context, 
the Court of Claims explained: 
The client does not waive the privilege by bringing a suit which places 
the validity of the patent in issue.  Waiver does not occur until the client 
places in issue the communication itself.  This most frequently occurs in 
suits between a client and his attorney or where there is a prima facie case 
of fraud based upon the dealings between the client and his attorney.342 
In this explanation, the court clarified that a suit based on the patent 
lawyer’s advice does not itself disclose the confidential communication 
or place it at issue. 
Another insightful case involving neither tax nor patents is Schenet v. 
Anderson, which was a 1988 case decided by the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan.343  The plaintiff sought production of draft 
purchase offers that had been prepared by the defendant’s attorneys.344  
The defendants opposed this by asserting attorney–client privilege.345  
The plaintiff claimed that privilege was inapplicable because the 
defendant had communicated information to the attorneys for their “use 
in preparing a document to be disclosed to the public.”346 
The court resolved the dispute with the following analysis: 
Accordingly, the attorney–client privilege applies to all information 
conveyed by clients to their attorneys for the purpose of drafting 
documents to be disclosed to third persons and all documents reflecting 
such information, to the extent that such information is not contained in 
 
 339. Id. at 940 (internal citations omitted). 
 340. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 18, at 229. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 941 n.6. 
 343. Schenet v. Anderson, 678 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Mich. 1988). 
 344. Id. at 1281. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 1282. 
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the document published and is not otherwise disclosed to third persons.  
With regard to preliminary drafts of documents intended to be made 
public, the court holds that preliminary drafts may be protected by the 
attorney–client privilege.  Preliminary drafts may reflect not only client 
confidences, but also the legal advice and opinions of attorneys, all of 
which is protected by the attorney–client privilege.  The privilege is 
waived only as to those portions of the preliminary drafts ultimately 
revealed to third parties.347 
Thus, in light of the weight of authorities from tax and other disciplines, 
Cote was correct to limit its waiver holding to the accountant’s 
workpapers supporting the filed return, and not to extend waiver to a 
broader subject matter such as attorney communications. 
In sum, when faced with an assertion that filing a return has triggered 
a waiver of privilege, courts should be careful to not jump to a waiver 
analysis prematurely before clearly determining privilege has first 
attached.  If a waiver analysis is necessary, courts should follow the 
advice and example of the Eighth Circuit in narrowly defining the scope 
of the waived subject matter to supporting return preparation 
workpapers. 
2. The Need for a Common Sense Approach for Disclosures to Return 
Preparers 
Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States has had significant 
repercussions despite its status as a mere unpublished opinion.348  
Unpublished opinions are not uncommon in the tax context; they can be 
quite impactful.349 
Long-Term Capital Holdings received a lot of attention within the tax 
professions because of the earth-shattering determination that the 
disclosure of tax advice to a return preparer contributed to a waiver of 
privilege.  To date, the case has been cited more than a hundred times.350  
Most of the citations have appeared in secondary sources (including 
several well-known treatises), which undoubtedly increased visibility of 
the case.351  Three courts have relied upon it in their opinions.352 
 
 347. Id. at 1283–84 (emphasis added). 
 348. Search of Westlaw, KeyCite (May 18, 2012). 
 349. There are many cases illustrating this trend.  One is Rose v. Commissioner, which was a 2008 
unpublished opinion by the Eleventh Circuit. See Rose v. Commissioner, No. 07-12245, 2008 WL 
1823309 (11th Cir. 2008).  Search of, Westlaw KeyCite (May 23, 2012).  It has been cited 39 times, 
including by one court.  Another such case is Hubert Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, which was an 
unpublished opinion of the Sixth Circuit in 2007.  Hubert Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 05-
2616, 2007 WL 1244314 (6th Cir. 2007).  It has been cited sixty-two times, including in four judicial 
opinions. 
 350. Search of Westlaw, KeyCite (May 18, 2012).  
 351. Id. 
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The district court later granted a motion for rehearing and in a second 
unpublished opinion modified somewhat its holding with respect to 
waiver by disclosure to a return preparer.353  The court accepted partially 
the taxpayer’s assertion that the fairness doctrine should apply to limit 
the scope of waiver from such an extrajudicial disclosure of attorney–
client communications.354  The court ultimately held that the disclosure 
waived only part of the K&S opinion—the section that “reflects the 
matters actually disclosed.”355  The court held the other sections of the 
K&S opinion to remain undisclosed.356 
This revised opinion hardly brings much comfort to tax practitioners.  
Ultimately, a disclosure to a return preparer was deemed to trigger a 
waiver.357  Due to the ambiguous nature of the court’s second opinion, it 
was difficult to discern how much of the K&S opinion was deemed 
waived or what that waived portion contained.  The revised opinion 
continued to be poorly reasoned and supports bad policy in discouraging 
consultation with tax practitioners. 
As noted previously, tax planning advice must in some manner be 
effected via the return and filed with the IRS.358  However, return 
preparation services are rarely provided by lawyers; more frequently, 
returns are prepared by professionals with a strong understanding of 
accounting and the ability to decipher financial data.359  To do his or her 
job, the return preparer has a clear need to know the conclusion of tax 
advice provided by a lawyer or federally authorized tax practitioner.  It 
is that conclusion that the return preparer must implement in the tax 
return. 
The tax laws are complicated in theory and in application, so it is not 
always obvious how lawyers or federally authorized tax practitioners 
arrive at their conclusion.360  To be confident in the conclusion that he or 
 
 352. Id. 
 353. Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2003 WL 1548770, slip 
op. at *10 (D. Conn. 2003). 
 354. Id. at *9. 
 355. Id.  
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. at *3. 
 358. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 18, at 299. 
 359. Phillip E. Hassman, What Constitutes Privileged Communications with Preparer of Federal 
Tax Returns So As To Render Communications Inadmissible in Federal Tax Prosecution, 36 A.L.R. 
Fed. 686, § 2[a] (1978) (“Accountants frequently prepare others’ tax returns for compensation—that is, 
they are frequently ‘preparers.”). 
 360. 1 BORIS I. BITTKER &  LAWRENCE LOKKEN, Statutory Construction, in FED. TAX ’N INCOME, 
EST. &  GIFTS ¶ 4.2.1 (2012) (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s famous observation: “In my own case the 
words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless 
procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—couched in abstract terms 
that offer no handle to seize hold of—leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, 
but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at 
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she is being asked to reflect in the return, the return preparer needs to 
understand how the conclusion is justified under the tax laws.  Often this 
necessitates explaining the legal analysis to the return preparer.  This is 
a common approach.  Return preparers are not mindless automatons.  
They are professionals with ethical standards that might be 
compromised if they are unable to get assurance of the legal accuracy of 
the conclusion they are reporting to the IRS. 
Indeed, in the court’s revised opinion, the testimony of the taxpayer’s 
return preparer is insightful: 
Petitioners’ accountant, Brett Yacker, testified at his deposition that he 
was told by Larry Noe, Petitioners’ in-house counsel, that Petitioners had 
a legal opinion from K&S, upon which they would rely, that says that it is 
“more likely than not” that the loss can be taken.  Specifically, Brett 
Yacker testified that When Larry Noe went through the 
transaction . . . telling us that they had a legal opinion from Sherman & 
Sterling . . . that gave us great comfort.  And then on the transaction itself, 
if it would create a loss, that they have a legal opinion from King & 
Spalding that’s more likely than not that the loss can be taken, satisfied 
our fiduciary duty to make sure that the position could be reported.361 
Mr. Yacker’s testimony is typical of most return preparers who take 
their fiduciary duty and their professionalism seriously by asking 
important questions to be assured of the accuracy of the return they 
prepare. 
It is significant to note that if Mr. Yacker had been an employee of 
the taxpayer, it is very unlikely that there would have been any issue of 
waiver in sharing the conclusion and underlying legal analysis of the 
K&S opinion.  Within a corporation, legal advice may be shared on a 
confidential basis with employees on a “need to know” basis.362  As an 
in-house return preparer would have a need to know the conclusion and 
underlying legal analysis to implement the K&S tax advice, this type of 
disclosure would have been permissible and not triggered a waiver.  The 
key in Long-Term Capital Holdings was that Mr. Yacker was not the 
taxpayer’s employee and was considered a third party for purposes of 
testing waiver. 
The application of waiver, however, should not turn on whether or 
not one is an employee.  Large corporations may have an in-house staff 
of return preparers.  Other corporations and non-corporate taxpayers hire 
return preparers to prepare their returns as necessary on a more limited 
 
all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time”). 
 361. Long-Term Capital Holdings, No. 3:01 CV 1290, 2003 WL 1548770, slip op. at *8 n.17 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 14, 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
 362. Alexander C. Black, What Corporate Communications Are Entitled to Attorney–Client 
Privilege—Modern Cases, 27 A.L.R.5th 76, § 2 (1995). 
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basis.  Taking the latter approach should not alter the outcome of a 
waiver analysis. 
Courts should take a common sense approach to avoid nonsensical, 
unprincipled results.  For example, broadly accepted principles of 
privilege indicate protection extends to communications made to or in 
the presence of the “subordinates of the attorney.”363  It would be logical 
and appropriate to view a return preparer as a type of such attorney 
subordinate because the return preparer is implementing the attorney’s 
tax advice.  This would be so whether the taxpayer or the lawyer 
technically hired the return preparer. 
Regardless of the circumstances under which a return preparer is 
hired, such professionals have a need to know the conclusion of tax 
advice to implement it on the tax return, and they have professional 
duties to ensure they are accurately reporting the taxpayer’s liability.  
The privilege protection of a taxpayer should not be curtailed because of 
these needs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For too long, waiver of privilege has been misunderstood by many tax 
practitioners and their clients in part because of the muddled state of the 
law.  Tax practitioners should be aware of certain particularly nasty 
pitfalls.  They should realize the potential to waive privilege by not 
asserting it when the government poses questions about tax advice.  Tax 
practitioners should also comprehend the risks if they consider a tactical 
waiver; the scope of waived subject matter may ultimately be deemed 
much broader than the tax practitioner envisioned.  Tax practitioners 
should also appreciate and plan for the difficulties of working with 
independent auditors on tax reserve issues. 
Further, the courts should take great care in deciding waiver cases in 
the tax context.  Specifically, they should appreciate the limited holding 
of Cote in finding a waiver of privilege due to the filing of a return.  
Judges should not misapply the Cote rule to permit access broadly to 
confidential communications due simply to the filing of a tax return. 
Courts should also be wary of following the questionable precedent of 
Long-Term Capital Holdings that disclosing the “gist” of tax advice to a 
return preparer triggers a waiver.  Such disclosure is necessary to effect 
the tax advice and to respect the professionalism of the return preparer.  
A waiver in such contexts has the potential to eviscerate the attorney–
client privilege in the tax context.  This would be bad policy and would 
 
 363. Kent Sinclair, Rule 501 Privileges: General Rule, in PLI TRIAL HANDBOOK, RE 95 (2012) 
(“The privilege also extends to communications made to or in the presence of subordinates of the 
attorney . . . .”). 
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go against the long, established history of applying privilege in this 
context. 
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